Every so often, it seems, humankind almost en masse has a compulsion to speculate, and it yields to that compulsion with abandon, -Robert T. I'atterson, The Great Boom and Panic, p xiii.
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'4/ 'K, 'K if stock pm'ice bubbles exist, economic policvmaker's face a difficult pr-oblem because bubbles suggest that plans to save and invest may be based on irrational criteria arid subject to em-r-atic change."
'h'he purpose of this paper is to compare tile inrnplications of a theory of stock prices based on fundarnenitals to one that allows for' bubbles, then to examinẽ Keynes(1935) , p. 159. Keynes discussed erratic shifts in the investment schedule caused by changes in the "state of confidence" (pp. 153-55) and "speculation" (p. 161). He argues that a boom which is destined to end in a slump is caused, therefore, by the combination of a rate of interest, which in a correctstate of expectation would be moo high for full employment, with a misguided stare of expectation which, so long as it lasts, prevents this rate on interest from being in tact deterrent A boom is a situation in which over-optimism tr,umphs over a rate of interest which, in a cooler tight, would be seen to be excessive" (p. 322).
See, as well, Gordon (1952) , p, 378 and Varian (1979) .
e~idence from the 1920s and the 1980s to determine which set of implications is suppom'ted by the data. The behavtor of stock prices during these two pen'iods is patticu-lam' useful in testing asset prices Din' the presence of speculative bubbles. The 1 924-29 experience is one of the most significant bull markets in U.S. history in both its dun-anon and nate of advance. Thoughi riot quite as rir-aniatic. the behavior of stock in the 1980s has tieeti similar~. If stock price bubbles exist, these are likely places to look for' them
THE FUNDAMENTALS OF STOCK PRICES
People value common stocks for their expected n'ef ut-n. Since irives tot's mu a choose among Iiroarl categories ol' stock, the expected r'ettrm-n on an~'particular stock must be equal to the expected return on other' stocks of similar risk-For example, if a particular' stock is expected to yield a relatively low return, inyestots will shun it causing its price to fall, This raises its expected retun'n, 'the reverse holds for any stock with an expected return that is higher than other stocks of similar risk, An equilibrium exists when the expected m'eturns are equal actoss equally risky stocks-Economists call this equilibrium retur'n the t-equired discount rate, Equation t calculates the expected retur'n from holding a stock for' one year-assuming dividends are paid at year-end,'
(1) Expected Rate of Return = Forecast of pr'ice at year end ±Forecast of dividend -Current Price
Current Price
Equation 2 solves equation 1 for the current price by noting that the expected retun'n is equal to the required discount rate in equilibrium.
(2) Current Pt-ice = Forecast of price at year-end + For-ecast of dividend
(1 + Required discount tate)
The Price Depends on Forecasts of Future Outcomes
The impor'tant thing to note in equation 2 is that the current price depends on forecasts offuture outcomes which, of course, are subject to change as new information becomes available. 'the price does not depend on dividends that at-c observed in the present as Senator King and others have implied in their comments on the hehavion' of stock pt-ices during the 1920s (see shaded insert on page 171. The current price may change even though observed dividends do not and conversely.
How Far Ahead?
The discussion so far indicates that investors must forecast the price of the stock next period. What are the fi,tndarnentals for this future pm-ice? In principle, the future pt'ice depends on the stn-ean of dividends and the required discount rate investors expect to prevail over-the life of the firm, Typically this n-cquin'es forecasts that extend into the distant future and suggests that the job of analyzing stock prices is formi-'See Brealey (1983) , pp. 67-72, and Brealey and Meyers (1984) 
The Price Fundamentals
Restating the solution for the current price as in equation 3 is particularly useful for the purposes of this paper. Equation 3 is a list of the pt-ice fundanientals: the forecast of the dividend next period, the required discount rate, and the expected forecast) growth t-ate of dividends. The solution for the current price in equation 3 is called the fundamentals price. Furthermore, the equation can he used to show how relatively small changes in forecasts can account for relatively lam-ge changes in the fundamentals pt-ice. For example, suppose investors forecast a year-end clividend of 5.60 per' shame, an annual dividend growth tate of 6 pet-cent arid the r'equir'ed chscount mate is 8 petcent. Equation 3 indicates that the fundamentals price is $30 per share [=.6/),08-.06)], Now suppose that new information leads investors to lower the f'ot-ecast of dividend growth to 5 percent. This is a decline of about 17 percent in expected gm-owth 1= l,01/,0611001. The fundamentals pt-ice, however, declines to $20
.6/LOS -.05)1, or more than 30 percent. Notice that a latge decline in price may occur even though observed dividend payments do riot change. It is even possible for the pt-ice to decline when observed dividends rise. Table 1 shows annual average growth rates of the Dow Jones Industrial Index in each year during the two hull mar'kets." The index rose tapidl~during the 'Brealey (1983) (1962) . When possible, the statistical results obtained with this data were checked against results using daily closing levels of the Standard and Poor's Composite Index, In no case were any qualitative differences observed. A rpid -tdv, t e in stick pr it s rio s~I i' sir g if it resul s fm (1 u uang s 'mu tlu ' In t d am utals. I ie inv igatot', hr i i~n-, seldom i-s tli In xttrv of dir oliscrvation of Ii I md at i u tls istuad , orl ' ' i it i thl s it i~~d SI h art fir i v I to I t'ovtde 'nfl r I iati( It al o mt it 1 i ni t-of the u (iii', lie I fund am u 'nit tl s n st hr is dl '0' e ,r pI , ( r"di ii -uket hut test maRs it jar I livid 'n I p-tym i s tnt 1 r Ut r "d to pr'ivt r ' u'~' ndisr' urt 'aid u'e, 1 crr'l st-e,ri olh t tie I vi~eu , I 's 'Ii ) )rtllu tor gmuzr ti hit, cit 1 est, t bt di -or o Ii SC Ior' itherl ii' ixrt t git r Iv'tr tug i ii ir-oxiru tI u 0 Ii' 1 e tat or ol th' lid an en tls n I, itt ict a nil, tIm i nuv I n(vliil" ~'digi(~,1sr iyhc,me'tuileo tli -t r(,S( Long-ter-mn rates were roughly constant I'm-om 1924-29 ."' Data on actual per share dividends are very sketchy for this period. One estimate, however, indicates that actual dlividends itiereasedi at an annual n'ate of about 8.8 percent from 1924-29." While this is a fairly rapid rate of mid-ease, it is far less than the growth observed in stockvalues. (See shadled inset-t on opposite page fot' a rnor'e precise estinnate of the relationship between stock prices and these pt-ox~van-ahles.I When the market ci-ashed, people like Senator King pointed to these proxy variables atid claimed that stock pt'ices liefrire October-1929 contained 'water and hot air. ' ' Art alternative explanation is that the pi-oxies give a misleading impression of the behavior of the fundamentals.
STOCK PRICES AND MEASURES OF THE FUNDAMENTALS
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FUNDAMENTALS, FOOLS AND BUBBLES
In rirder to evaluate the notion that stock prices in the 192Os arid! l9SOs were driven by psychological factors extraneous to the fundamentals, it is necessary to be cleam'er' aliout the implications the alter'native h~potlieseshave for var'iables that can he observed by the investigator. This paper considers three different theories that potentially explain stock prices: the efficient market hypothesis, the greater fool theory and the theory of rational buhibles.
Efficient ilIarkets and Fundamentals
A long-standing pr'oPosition in both economics am! finance is that stock pnces are formed in efficient mar-kets. ' " This means that all of the relevant infom-malion currently known about ititemest rates, dividends and the futum-e prospects for firnis is contained in current stock prices. Stock pr-ices change only when tiew infot-niation m-egarding the humidarnentals is obtained by someone. New information, by dlefinition, cannot lie predicted aheadi rif its arrival; because the news is just as likely to he goodi as it is to lie bad, jumps in stock pr-ices cannot be pr'edicted in advance.
Many present-day stock niar'ket analysts arc skeptical of the efficient markets hypothesis." Similarly, "See Friedman and Schwartz (1982) Brealey and Meyers (1984), pp. 266-81; Malkiel (1981) , PP. 171-79; Brealey (1983), pp. 15-18; Leroy (1982) and Fama (1970) . "See Malkiel (1981) , Pp. 126-79.
traders in time I 920s germerally did mmot subscribe to it (see slmaded insent (in followimmg page). But that is riot important. If the behavior' of stock pm-ices is commsistent with time implications of time theory, the imypothesis imeips both to understammdl hmow stock nuam'kets wom'k and to evaluate the claim that time hull markets wem'e products of price hufibies.
If the efficienut rnan-kets hypothesis is cor'rec.t, past pr-ice changes contairu no useful information ahiout future pr-ice changes. With some added assumptions, this carm he tm-ammsiated into useful empim-ical pn'opositions. If tIme expected return to holdimmg stock is constanit ammd time volatility of stock prices does mmot cimange during time time pem'iod examined, time efficient market hypothesis implies that observed changes in stock pm-ices should he unicorn-elated amid tiuat lir'ice cimammges shouidl riot exhibit long sedluences of successive changes that are gr-eatem-om-less than time median cimammge for time sample.
'time above propositions should hold everm if time level of stock pm-ices appears to drift upward or dowmmwam-d. These propositions concern time n-ehationsimip between the sequence of price cimarmges, not the average cimange over' some specific. period. Clearly, stock prices dm-ifted upward dluninmg hoth hull nmiar-kets; but that does not necessar'ilv mean that price changes wem'e con-i-elated or-that thmer'e were ionmg n-umms of positive changes that exceeded time rmiediarm change for-these periods. Put differently, it tioes riot mmecessarily nuean that mmmarket participants were ahile to pr'edic.t future changes in stock prices by observing the past.
Greater Fools
Time nuotionl thmat self-feedimmg speculative tiutihihes, Ott occasion, can drive stock prices is knowmm as time 'gm-eater fool timeor-v. ' ' Accordlirmg t ri tins thmeory, people n-egan'd the fundamentals as irrelevantt. Rather', tlucy buy stock on time belief that some t bigger?) fool will buy the shares from them at a higher-price in the future, People maintain this belief because they think "that market values will rise -as they did yesterday or last week-and a profit can be made."~Once the speculation begins, stock prices continue rising because people, seeing the rise in the pm-evious period, demand additional shares in the belief that pr-ices will commtirmue to rise. This pushes prices still higher.
The greater fool theory is based on time presunmption that there are times when past movements in stock pt-ices matter. According to this theory, during the "fooling" periods, there should he positive cot-relation in the past sequence of pr-ice changes and long nuns of positive changes that exceed the median change for the sample period. ' 4 Galbraith (1955 ), p. 23. See, as well, Malkiel (1981 , pp. 31-49.
Recently, some economists have discussed the possibility that stock pr-ices mnay contain "rational" bubbles," The theory of rational price bubbles is based on the belief that some asset pm-ices (for example, stock, gold and foreign currency prices) ar-c too variable to be justified by vam'iation in the fundamentals," (A nuore fornmal theory of pn'ice bubbles is sumnmarized in the appendix to this papem'J Bn-iefly, the theory says that there may lie occasions when stock prices deviate from the pm-ice that is consistent with the fundamentals. The deviation is called a bubble.
"See Flood and Garber (1980 and 1982) , . West (1986) , Diba and Grossman (1985 and 1986) and the appendix to the paper.
"See, for example, Shiller (1981) and Mankiw, IRomer and Shapiro (1985) .
Rational Bubbles
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Bubbles must possess certain characteristics if they ate to have economic significance:
Bubbles must be persistent so that a fom'ecast of stock prices based solely on the fundamentals is biased, This means that fom'ecast erm'ors (actual price minus forecast price) will tend to have the same sign and not average out, The persistence of one-sided er'rors is important because random variation in the data generally will cause the actual price to differ front any well-constructed forecast of the price even though a bubble is not present. ti bubbles were only a name used to describe m'andom variation in the data, they would not be very interesting, Bubbles must be ecplosive in the sense that they must grow at a rate that compensates the stock purchaser fot-the additional amount invested in the stock due to the bubble, ln addition, there may be a risk premium to compensate stockholders for the additional risk that the bubble may burst," 'f'his characteristic causes the price to deviate further and further from the fundamentals for as long as the bubble lasts, Bubbles can not be negative. A negative bubble means that stock pr'ices are less than implied by the fundamentals, 't'he explosive characteristic of bubbles means that the prices implode with some chance that stock prices will be negative at some futum'e date," Negative stock prices, however, are impossible; they are inconsistent with the liability rules associated with common stock which limit potential losses to the extent of the initial investment,
RATIONAL BUBBLES AND STOCK PRICE BEHAVIOR
The theory of rational Imubbles has implications for the hmehavior of stock prices that are different than the theomy of efficient man'kets.'°This is shown in tahie 2, wtiich makes use of the fundamentals theory of stock price determination discussed above. Uric impor'tant assumption of this exanmple is that, at each moment in time, investors expect dividends to grow at a constant n'ate over-the future. To keep timings simple, the example assumes that subsequent events confor'm "See Dibaand Grossman (1985 and 1986) , , Flood and Garber (1980) , West (1986) and the appendix to this paper.
"See Diba and Grossman (1985 and 1986) and . "See Diba and Grossman (1985) and the appendix.
to time expectations of investors (perfect foresight, an extreme version of rational expectations) and that the dividend is initially expected to he $2, 'rite expected dividend is constant iii panel A (expected growth rate is zer'o) but gr'ows in panel B at atm expected annual r'ate of 2 percent. 'lIme n'equim'ed discount rate is 10 percent, and a bubble of $1 occum's in period zero, Colunmn 3 of panel A computes time fundamentals price, P-This is simply the expected dividlend, E,)D,.,) = $2, (assumed constant in panel A) divided by the diffen'ence between the m-equir-ed discount rate, r = 10, and the expected growth rate in dividends, g = 0. The fundamentals price is $20 each period.
The foun'th column computes the bubble componemmt of the price. As discusser! above, the bubble expands over time at the r'equired discount rate, r, The observed price, I',, is the sum of the fundamentals price and the bubble as in column 5, Column hi calculates the pen'centage changes in time pn'ice. 'these ar-c positive. More impor'tantly, the numbers in column 6 rise oyen time indicating that this bubble prodtices a timne series of observed price changes that are positively correlated, The observed price does not follow a random walk, Of course, the real world is nevem-so neat, Changes in the fundamentals -r',g, E,D,j -may cause the observed price to change in a way that masks the bubble, If that occurs, however, it is not clear that the bubble is very important since an investor's behavior' under the theory of rational bubbles depemmds on his ability to detect the presetice of bubbles, 'l'he exatnple in panel B is similar to the example in panel A except that dividends are expected to grow at a 2 percent annual rate. Notice that this does not change the qualitative result with respect to the observed price changes, These rise river time and will he positively correlated, The only difference between the two exanmples is that time fundamentals price in panel B rises (drifts upward) over time at a constant 2 percent rate (see column 7). This results from the gr'owth in dividends. While the fundamentals price drifts upwam'd at a constant n-ate of 2 pet-cent, the sequence of changes in the fundamentals pm-ice are uncorrelated, The fundamentals price will follow a random walk with drift.
An important thing to note is that both the greater fool theony and the theory of price bubbles discussed in this paper' imply that stock prices behave similam-ly. Both reject the efficient markets hypothesis, which implies that stock prices follow a n'andom walk, 
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SOME PROBLEMS WITH BUBBLES
'lime notion timat stock pm-ices at-c influenced by bubbles is troublesome because it is not based on a well-specified theory. A complete rlmeorv of bubbles should idemmtifv the cause of bubbles irm ten-ms of some pimermonmermori f/rat can be observed se/Xtratelv fromn btrbhles themselves. Oct those occasions wlmetm the cause is obsenved, a bubble simould also lie obsemved and cormver'selv. This allows a direct test of the theory anmd explains why bubbles nnay be observed on some occasions but not otimers. mm commtn-ast, time greater fool and n-ational bubble theories do not suggest a cause of bubbles timat can lie observed separately. Rather, unusual pn'ice behavior (time hublmle ) is attributed to ''interise optirmmisnn, '' ''a commmpulsionm to speculate '' and '' nmanias. 'These do rmot identify time cause of the bubble; they merely give the br,rhble a diffen-ent name." 'llmese crrticismmms suggest tlmat attributing crashes in stock prices to bun'stumg bubbles adds notiming to our urmder-starmding of~vlm~' cm-ashes occur or how to pr-event simmmilar' occur-r-ences in time future. To illustrate, " Brunner and Meltzer (1987) note that Some further reflections on bubbles and sunspots equilibria should make us doubt their contribution to a uselul reconciliation or analysis wirh critical observariens. The bubble term refers neither directly nor indirectly ro any observable entities. It is fundamentally ,nconsistent wilh any rational exploitation of intormarion invoked by the same analysis (p. 2).
See, as welt, Singleton (1987 ), pp. 28-30. Sirkin (1975 and Schwartz (1981) , p. 25 , question the bubble hypothesis as an explanation of the 1929 crash,
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Wesley Clair Mitchell (a noted student of business cycles~wrote that B a combination of various agencies such as public regulation of tIre prospectuses of new comnparmies, legislation suppolted by efficienmr administration against fraudulent promotion, more rigid requirements on the part of stock exchanges concerning the securities admitted to official lists, more efficient agencies for-giving investor's infornmation ,armd more conservative policy 0mm the part of the banks toward speculative hoonms, we have learned to avoid cen-tain of the n'ashest err'ors committed by ear-tier generations." 
EFFICIENT MARKETS VS. PRICE BUBBLES: SOME EVIDENCE
The efficient markets hypothesis suggests that stock prices follow a random walk. The hypothesis has no implication for the drift in stock prices. Pm-ices may be higher-or lower at the end of time period being examined, Neither of these events is necessarily inconsistent with the hypothesis. Rather, the hypotimesis implies that time sequence of price changes are unrelated; they behave as random van-iaimles. In contn-ast, time gm-eater-fool theonv and the theory of rational bubbles discussed here imply that changes in stock pmices are not randonm but ar-c positively m-elated. Wimicim explanatiom'm is better supported liv the evidence for the 1924-29 and 1982-437 hull markets? To evaluate timese theories, data on the level of time Dow Jones Industrial tndex are used. Two periods are examined. Omme extends trom January 3, 1928, flmrouglm September 3, 1929. 'tlme second rutms fmonm Jam'mr.rany 2, 1986 , through August 25,1987 , The data are first differetices of time log of the Dow's daily closing level nmultiplied by 100 amid ar-c approximately equal to the daily percentage change in the index. Each sample cormtams more tharm 400 obsemvationms. Stock prices advanced very rapidly in these periods. If buhimles were present, they should he apparent irm these data. 
Were Stock Prices~4Random Walk?
"l '7/7/ ficant correlation at conventional confidence levels." Stock pr-ices followed a random walk, which is consistent with the efficient markets hypothesis. Table 3 also shows the mean change fom each period. The means are positive and significantly different from zero in a statistical sense. Today, the upward drift in stock pr-ices during these time periods is obi'ious. At tlmat time, however, the upward drift is not something that investors could have bet on with any confidence.
Runs Test
A mun is the number of sequemmtial observations that are greater or less than the sample nnedian (the middle value of the sample(. If a series of observations exhibits too few runs relative to what is expected for independent observations, the data are positively correlated or drawn from diffem-ent populations.
The efficient markets hypothesis suggests that observed changes in stock prices are uncorrelated, that is, the changes are independent of one another. This means, for exanmpie, that there is no tendency for a lange positive change to be followed by another-lam-ge positive change. Consequently, the sequence of observed changes will nmove back and forth across the median change for-the sample fairly frequently as shown in panel A of chart 2. lf changes in stock pm-ices "Daily data between October 22, 1929, and March 31, 1930, show significant autocorreiation at various lags. This is likely a statistical artifact produced by a substantial increase in the variance of the data at the time of the crash in October and November that appears to taper off over time. Consequently, the significant correlations do not suggest the presence of a bubble. Furthermore, stock prices were declining at this time and bubbles can not be negative.
am-c correlated as implied by the bubble hypothesis, however, a plot of the observations in the omden' that they appear will indicate some tracking as shown in panel B. This plot crosses the sample median infrequently. The example exhibits relatively long and, consequently, t'ewen-runs than expected of independent observations." Table 4 presents the results of a runs test for the bull mankets of the 1920s and 1980s. The third column of the table shows the number of runs observed for daily percentage changes in the Dow Jones Industrial tndex during each period of rapidly increasing stock prices. Column 4 gives the number of runs expected for a series of (495 and 417) independent obsemvations and column 5 gives the variance of this series. Since the observed number of runs is nmot much different than expected, the hypothesis that percentage changes in the Dow ltmdex behaved randomly during the sample periods is not mejected by this data.
'l'he evidence on the behavior of stock prices Ias chamacteHzed by the Dow Index) is not consistent with the notion that stock prices wet-c driven by selffeeding speculative bubbles during the 1920s and 1980s.
CONCLUSION
Many people attribute the stock market crashes of 1929 and 1987 to bursting speculative bubbles. The perception that stock prices may be driven by bubbles presents economic policynmakers with an important problem because such bubbles suggest that plans to "See Wonnacott and Wonnacotl (1977), pp. 486-88. save and invest nmay be based on im-rational enter-ia ammd subject to er-r-atic behavior.
'rhis papem has exarnimmed data on stock pr-ices around the time of the Coolidge and Reagan hull markets. The paper provides evidence contrary to the notion that the cm-ashes weme the result of bursting speculative bubbles. No evidence was found that changes in stock prices were autocorrelated or-that the data contained long runs. Rather, the data suggest that stock prices followed a randonm walk. Tlmis evidence is consistent with the efficient markets hvpothesis, which is based on the proposition that all melevant and ascentainahle infonmation regarding stock pm'ice fundamentals (interest n'ates, dividends, future prospects, etc,I is contained in current stock prices.
